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To the great and on-going public debate on the proper scope of
judicial review, notable contributions have been forthcoming from two
distinguished students of the Supreme Court who have, last year and
this, delivered the annual Holmes Lecture at Harvard. The first of
these contributions is Learned Hand's eloquent essay "The Bill of
Rights." ' The second, partly responsive to Judge Hand and partly
building upon him, is Herbert Wechsler's characteristically provocative
and thoughtful paper, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law." 2 In insisting on neutral constitutional adjudication, Professor
* This Article was largely written during the past summer, when the writer
was privileged to participate in a Seminar on Legal Sanctions in Desegregation Cases,
conducted by the University of Wisconsin Law School, with the support of the Ford
Foundation. The seminar dealt, at least tangentially, with a number of the problems
considered here, and some of the thinking which underlies this essay was shaped by
the provocative and friendly interchange among the members of the seminar: G. W.
Foster, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin and skillful ringmaster
of the seminar; Harry Ball, Professor of Sociology at Pomona; Paul Mishklin, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania; Paul Sanders, Professor of Law
at Vanderbilt; George Simpson, Professor of Anthropology and Sociology at Oberlin;
and Melvin Tunin, Professor of Sociology at Princeton. This Article also draws
upon extremely rewarding conversations with J. Willard Hurst and Samuel Mermin,
Professors of Law at the University of Wisconsin, and with several of the writer's
colleagues at Yale.
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University Law School. A.B., 1943, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1948, Yale University.
'Printed in book form as HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958) (hereinafter

cited as

HAND).
2 Printed in the current issue of the Harvard Law Review at 73 HARv. L. R v.

1 (1959)

(hereinafter cited as Wechsler).
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Wechsler blueprints a sound theoretical structure of reasoned and
dispassionate judicial review. But he singles out as prime examples
of judicial unneutrality the major recent Supreme Court decisions in
the field of race discrimination, culminating in the Court's consideration
of segregation in the public schools. Because the decisions Professor
Wechsler challenges doubtless comprise the most significant judicial
restatement of our national policy in -thepast century, it seems important
to consider whether the decisions are not in fact valid exercises of the
power of judicial review.
Professor Wechsler begins his paper by delineating the differences
between his position and that of Judge Hand. Judge Hand, it will be
recalled, expounds the thesis that the Supreme Court's power to review
the constitutionality of acts of other branches of national and state
government is not one which can be found in or fairly inferred from
the words of the Constitution. But the power of keeping government
officials within their prescribed limits was one which, Judge Hand
believes, the Court had to assume nonetheless: the absence of such a
power would have invited anarchy, and "in construing written documents it has always been thought proper to engraft upon the text such
provisions as are necessary to prevent the failure of the undertaking." 8
What this doctrine implies, however, is merely an authority, to be
exercised as sparingly as possible, to confine officials to actions within
their realms of assigned responsibility, but never an authority to review
the substance of such actions. In arrogating to itself the latter authority
---especially in measuring federal and state laws against the broad
strictures of the fifth and fourteenth amendments-the Supreme Court
has illicitly and undemocratically assumed the role of a "third legislative
chamber." '
With Judge Hand's view of the propriety and scope of the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review, Professor Wechsler takes profound
issue. Like Marshall in Marbury v.Madison,' Professor Wechsler sees
the power of judicial review as one authenticated, and indeed required,
by the supremacy clause of the Constitution.' Judge Hand found the
supremacy clause an insufficient source of power, arguing indeed that
the specific mandate to state courts to defer to supreme federal law in
the event of conflict "looks rather against than in favor of a general
3 HAND 29.
4

Id. at 55.
55 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
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jurisdiction." ' But Professor Wechsler pointedly demonstrates that
the logic of this particular negative pregnant has most uncomfortable
implications: it either denies to the Supreme Court, when processing
appeals from state courts, the right to re-examine the constitutional
determinations made by the state courts at the behest of the supremacy
clause, or, perhaps even more paradoxically, it affirms the power of
judicial review as an ingredient of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over state courts while denying it in appeals from the lower
federal courts and in those lower federal courts themselves.8
Positing -the clear propriety of the power of judicial reviewrather than giving it, after Judge Hand's fashion, a left-handed welcome
as the twilight child of a doctrine of necessity-Professor Wechsler
asserts that its full exercise in cases within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is not dependent, as Judge Hand would have it, on "how importunately the occasion demands an answer," 9 but is a matter of
obligation."0
From all this it follows that the power of judicial review cannot
be confined, as Judge Hand none too hopefully seems ,tourge, to the
job of charting "the frontiers of another 'Department's' authority"
rather than reviewing "the propriety of its choices within those frontiers."" Professor Wechsler's acceptance of the full sweep of judicial
review carries with it acquiescence in the Supreme Court's scrutiny of
the substantive acts challenged as in conflict with constitutional limita7HAND 28.
8At this point in the argument, one who agrees with Professor Wechsler that
the Constitution does imply a system of judicial review is impelled, nevertheless, to
enter a partial demurrer to an analysis which overpowers but does not fully persuade. Indeed, it is an analysis so virulent as, by inversion, to undermine the
Supreme Court's asserted power to review state courts: if it is anachronistic to posit
a supreme federal tribunal sitting in review of state courts whose power to review
federal questions is not as broad as the obligation of the state courts to consider such
questions below, the anachronism casts as much doubt on the appellate relationshipwhich is not spelled out in the Constitution---as on the claimed disparity of power
to consider certain federal questions. The essential difficulty is that Professor
Wechsler's quasi-textual construct implies a purposive symmetry in the minds of the
framers which might better have expressed itself in some explicit avowal of the
powerful role to be played by the federal courts. Such avowal of the power of
judicial review does not appear in the text of the Constitution. But, as Professor
Wechsler indeed seems to acknowledge, the public expectation of Hamilton and
others that the courts would utter the last word on constitutional questions seems
an adequate basis for sustaining the authenticity of judicial review. Certainly it is
a less taxing, if less ingenious, basis than Professor Wechsler's potent syllogism.
9

HAND 15.
:10 Wechsler 6. Professor Wechsler of course takes careful note of limitations on the exercise of this obligation: e.g., the "political question" doctrine,
which he sees as part of the Constitution's basic distribution of authority; and the
discretion, embodied in certiorari practice, deliberately confided to the Court to allow
it largely to determine the character and sequence of the great public questions it
adjudicates.
11 HAND 29-30.
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tions. But Professor Wechsler insists, and properly so, that this
revisory power does not make the Supreme Court a "third legislative
chamber" if the Court employs appropriately dispassionate standards.
For judges charged with the task of judicial review must -take their
value spectrum from the Constitution and eschew the multitudinous and
far more transient personal policy preferences which legislators can
and should act upon.
Here indeed lies the heart of Professor Wechsler's thesis-insistence on the rational and disinterested application of constitutional
norms to all comparable controversies. This is the recipe for a
"principled decision . . . one that rests on reasons with respect
to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and
then neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.
When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of the Government or
of a state, those choices must, of course, survive. Otherwise, as
Holmes said in his first opinion for the Court, 'a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as
generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would
become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical
1 ,12
opinions ....
With this central ,thesis no quarrel should be forthcoming. No
quarrel, that is, except from those whose legal litmus paper is sensitive
to the identity of the litigant rather than the merits of his cause. But
for those whose Constitution is grounded in accepted canons of judicial
integrity, acquiescence in Professor Wechsler's neutral principles would
seem automatic. As Justice Frankfurter observed a decade ago in
Terminiello, when chastising his brethren of the majority for making a
federal case out of a sow's ear: "This is a court of review, not a tribunal
unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing
justice according to considerations of individual expediency." '
With insistence on adjudication by neutral principle as his point
of departure, Professor Wechsler turns to the formulation of a bill of
particulars-asserted failures by the Court in the recent past to do its
job of principled adjudication. And for a time he is on firm ground.
Thus, the Court certainly seems to merit censure when it summarily
disposes of important and difficult questions-for example, Gayle v.
12 Wechsler 19.

13 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949). The Court there by-passed an
extremely difficult free-speech issue-found a very tractable one-by pouncing on an
"error" never urged by petitioner in the state courts or in the Supreme Court. See
BERNs, FREDOM, VIRTUE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

113-15 (1957); Pollak, Mr.

Justice Frankfurter-Judgmentand the Fourteenth Amendment, 68
310 (1958).

YALE

L.J. 304,
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Browder,1 4 invalidating segregation on intrastate buses-via the inscrutable per curiam. This is a method of adjudication which, as
Professor Wechsler succinctly puts it, "makes it quite impossible to
speak of principled determinations or the statement and evaluation of
judicial reasons, since the Court has not disclosed the grounds on which
its judgments rest." " And Ernest Brown has made persuasive demonstration that the method is one to which the Court is showing signs of
addiction.'
The point at which Professor Wechsler invites serious controversy
is when he shifts from the Court's sins of omission to what he regards
as its sins of commission. Here he singles out three crucial instances in
which the Court has recently found race discrimination incompatible
with the Constitution-the white primary, the restrictive covenant, and
segregated public schools-and contends that none of these is based
"eon neutral principles and .

.

. entitled to approval in the only terms

• relevant to a decision of the courts." 17 Plainly enough all of
these milestone judgments have elicited in certain quarters the most
vigorous kind of public criticism. But very little criticism has been
forthcoming from those who believe, with Professor Wechsler, that
these cases "have the best chance of making an enduring contribution to
the quality of our society of any .

.

. in recent years." "8 His un-

'disguised hostility to the discriminations there uprooted lends impressive weight to his doubts that the decisions are supportable. Conversely,
the purity of his doubts imposes on those who have thought the decisions proper a special burden of reappraisal.
To make such a reappraisal is the main purpose of this essay.
No attempt is here made to dissect Professor Wechsler's concept of
neutrality of constitutional adjudication. Quite the contrary: this
essay accepts that concept on the assumption that what Professor
Wechsler has in mind is exorcising, once and for all, "the kadi .
dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency."
But it may be, as is suggested at the close of this paper, that Professor
Wechsler is really hunting larger game. In that event, the careful
scrutiny his theme of neutrality deserves must be undertaken elsewhere.
It does not lend itself easily to the immediate objective, which is to
review the momentous decisions Professor Wechsler is doubtful of.
14 352 U.S. 903, affirming 142 F. Supp. 707 (D. Ala. 1956).
15 Wechsler 20.
16 Brown, Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. Rrv. 77 (1958) ; cf. Bickel & Wellington,
Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HAsv. L.
REv. 1 (1957). Comment, 26 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 279 (1959).
17 Wechsler 27.
18 Ibid.
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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

In Shelley v. Kraemer, 9 the question was whether state courts
could, consistently with the equal protection clause, compel Negro
purchasers to vacate homes sold to them in contravention of racially
restrictive covenants. The Court acknowledged that the fourteenth
amendment curbs state authority as such, not private bigotry, and hence
neither "the restrictive agreements standing alone" nor "voluntary
adherence -totheir terms" presented any constitutional question." The
constitutional vice lay in judicial enforcement of the covenants; through
their courts "the States have made available to .

.

.

individuals the

full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds
, 21
of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights . ...
Imputing Private Prejudice to the States
Professor Wechsler has no difficulty with the thought that court
action is "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes. What
troubles him is the logic underlying "the crucial step .

.

that the

state may properly be charged with the discrimination when it does no
more than give effect to an agreement that the individual involved is,
by hypothesis, entirely free to make." '
So formulated, the query posed by Professor Wechsler seems reasonable enough, and it assuredly is not put to rest by anything said in
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion for the unanimous Court. But the very
simplicity of the words in which the query is phrased may obscure the
point at which analysis of the problem can profitably begin.
To say that the state, through one of its agencies, "does no more
than give effect to an agreement," carries with it the pleasing sense of
automation; asked to enforce a hypothetically valid private arrangement, a court has no option but to respond. And thus the state is insulated from responsibility for a course of action it has no hand in
initiating.
A few moments' reflection should serve to clarify the reasons for
attributing to the state responsibility for the private policies its courts
elect to implement. A question posed by Professor Wechsler may
serve as a convenient point of departure:
"Is the state forbidden to effectuate a will that draws a racial line,
a will that can accomplish any disposition only through the aid of
334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; cf. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
20 334 U.S. at 13.
2 Id. at 19.
22 Wechsler 29.
19
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law, or is it a sufficient answer there that the discrimination was
the testator's and not the state's?

[Citing Gordon v. Gordon]." '

The Gordon case was one of those unhappy internecine struggles to
which our testamentary structure so often lends itself-an action by
four sisters to terminate their brother's interest in the paternal estate
because the brother, in contravention of father's will, had married a
young lady so improvident as to be the issue of Catholic parents and
hence "a person not born in the Hebrew faith." By way of defense,
young Gordon urged, inter alia, that to enforce the limitation contained
in his father's will was a restraint on religious freedom and inconsistent
with other guarantees implicit and explicit in the fourteenth amendment.
Cited in support of the argument were the restrictive covenant cases and
the school segregation cases. But the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court concluded that those cases "involve quite different considerations
from the right to dispose of property by will." 24 And the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.2 5
But before reaching the constitutional issue the Massachusetts
court had dwelt at rather great length on the "contention . . . that a

restriction conditioned upon the religious faith of the parents of the
prospective wife at the time of her birth is unreasonable." I The issue
was regarded as a new one in Massachusetts, but in reliance on foreign
jurisdictions, particularly a line of New York decisions, the court concluded that the provision was a valid one. "The question is not whether
the testator used good judgment . . . in his will or whether we
should approve or disapprove his action. What we have to decide is
whether he was prevented from doing as he did by a rule of law. We
are unable to discover that he was."2 7
The New York cases relied on had indeed uniformly sustained
provisions of the kind at issue in Gordon-although (as the Massachusetts court observed but did not embroider on) "in each case .
the court found a way to prevent the forfeiture of the estate." 28 As
summarized by Judge Lehman twenty years ago, the New York rule
is as follows:
"A condition calculated to induce a beneficiary to marry, even to
marry in a manner desired by the testator, is not against public
policy. A condition calculated to induce a beneficiary to live in
23 Ibid. Gordon v. Gordon may be found in 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E2d 228, cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
24 332 Mass. at 208, 124 N.E.2d at 235.
25349 U.S. 947 (1955).
26 332 Mass. at 207, 124 N.E.2d at 234.
27332 Mass. at 207-8, 124 N.E.2d at 234.
28 332 Mass. at 207, 124 N.E2d at 234.
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celibacy or adultery is against public policy . . . Conditions in
partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose reasonable
restrictions upon marriage, are not against public policy." 29
Thus, in the recent Rosenthal litigation, Surrogate Collins bowed to the
ineluctable New York rule:
"The petitioner's situation commands the court's sympathy. It is
unfortunate that she cannot have both a marriage with the man of
her choice and the inheritance. Present are considerations which
tug at the heart but do not resolve the legal queries propounded
by the petition. Undeniably, Article Twelfth is discriminatory
but to discriminate in the disposition of property is frequently the
motivation of a will. A testator 'may exclude a child or other
descendant from any participation in his estate for sound reason,
or because of whim or prejudice which might seem unreasonable
to others' .

.

.

. The court is compelled to uphold the manifest

intent of the testator's will. The determination was written into
that will and is binding on the petitioner." 10
As it turned out, Surrogate Collins did have some flexibility as to
how to construe Mr. Rosenthal's will-or so, at least, a divided Appellate Division and a divided Court of Appeals concluded, parsing the
document with a generosity adequate to permit petitioner to "have both
a marriage with the man of her choice and the inheritance." 1 Surrogate Collins was right, however, in.his view that as a trial judge he
had no leeway to reject or modify the law of New York framed for
him by the Court of Appeals. But the strictures which bind Surrogate
Collins did not inhibit Judge Lehman and do not inhibit those who
today compose New York's-or Massachusetts'-highest tribunal. As
Judge Lehman made plain, the reasonableness-and hence the validity
-of challenged testamentary limitations turns on the "public policy"
of the state as that policy is fashioned and refashioned by its appellate
judges. When the New York Court of Appeals decides that it will
enforce a will designed to encourage Jew to marry Jew, or Catholic to
marry Catholic, but that it will turn its stony judicial face against a
testamentary provision "calculated to induce a beneficiary to live in
celibacy" (a lawful and honorable status in most jurisdictions), the
29
Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 464, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1939).
;3 In re Rosenthal's Estate, 204 Misc. 432, 440, 123 N.Y.S2d 326, 335 (Surr. Ct.
1953). But cf. Cardozo: "Judges march at times to pitiless conclusions under the
prod of remorseless logic which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They
deplore the sacrificial rite. They perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they obey the bidding of their office. The victim
is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on the altar of regularity." C.RDozo, THFE
GROWTH OF THE LAw 66 (1924).
31283 App. Div. 316, 127 N.Y.S.2d 778, aff'd, 307 N.Y. 715, 121 N.E.2d 539 (1954).
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court is choosing a policy and acting upon it. Moreover, frequent expressions of judicial distaste for the discriminatory arrangements reluctantly sustained do nothing to lessen their impact. "[T]he undertones of the opinion . .
seem utterly discordant with its conclusion.
. . . The case which irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting

precedent is that of Julia, who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent,"--consented.' "32
What has been said has of course no claim to novelty. But, at
the risk of laboring the obvious, the nature of judicial choice-of sovereign choice voiced by the courts-has been rehearsed as a reminder
of what Holmes observed half a century ago: "Law is a statement of
the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear
upon men through the courts." ' It is the disposition of this "public
force" which is really at issue when a court propounds the misleading
neutralism, "What we have to decide is whether he was prevented from
doing as he did by any rule of law." 3 4 What the court has to decide
is whether to enforce-to bring the "public force" to bear in behalf ofthe testament or covenant which the draftsman was entirely free to
commit to paper and which those within range of the instrument were
entirely free to adhere to of their own volition. And when the arrangements contemplated by the instrument will fail but for the intervention
of "public force"-when "it becomes not respondent's voluntary choice
but the State's choice that she observe her covenant or suffer damages" '5-the limitations of the fourteenth amendment come into play.
From Buchanan v. Warley to Shelley v. Kraemer
Of course, a finding of the requisite state action does not doom
the challenged discrimination. The existence of state action is a threshold problem, and with "this hurdle cleared" there remains "the ultimate substantive question, whether in the circumstances of this case
the action complained of was condemned by the Fourteenth Amendment.

.

.

."

" But in the case of the racial covenant, that "ultimate

substantive question"r-the absence of governmental power to put Negroes in one part of town and whites in another-had been determined
by the Supreme Court long before in Buchanan v. Warley.37 To be
sure, the unanimous decision voiding the Louisville zoning ordinance
32
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1946) (dissenting opinion of
Jackson, J.).
3 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
34 Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 207-08, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234 (1955).
5 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953).
3
6Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 72 (1955).
37245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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was apparently put upon due process grounds 3'rather than upon equal
protection to which the Court turned in Shelley v. Kraemer. Why the
opinion in Buchanan v. Warley took the shape it did is not hard to
conjecture; for one thing, the equal protection clause still bore the relatively fresh gloss of the "separate but equal" doctrine 9 which might
have been thought to support the even-handed injustice of the ordinance; for another, the protagonist of the fourteenth amendment was
the white seller disabled from selling to a Negro, and arguably he lacked
standing to talk in equal protection terms.:' Also, it bears remembering that Buchanan, decided in 1917, was the product of a judicial
climate quite receptive to the conclusion that a challenged economic
regulation "was not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the
state." "' Surely an equal protection approach would have been more
apposite, and, indeed, would have been the approach actually employed
had the case arisen a generation later. Passing the question which
section of the fourteenth amendment Buchanan should have turned on,
the point vital to the validity of Buchanan (and, derivatively, of Shelley) is that the elimination of racial criteria in land acquisition and
tenure was one of the few relatively clear purposes of the proponents of
the fourteenth amendment. So much Justice Day made abundantly
plain in Buchanan, relying on a statute of 1866,-the year the amendment was adopted by Congress-giving all "citizens, of every race and
color . . . the same right in every State and Territory . . . to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." ' The fourteenth
amendment has come to the aid of many-from corporations to Communists-whom its framers may have had no special interest in; certainly in those instances where the framers' protective purpose is
38 See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

39 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40 But cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
41
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917). Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 500 (1954): "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective. . . ."
42 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat 27. The statute, which was § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, also declared all persons other than untaxed Indians
born in the United States "to be citizens of the United States." The statute was
re-enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, two years
after the amendment's ratification, lending point to the Court's observation in Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948), that it was "enacted before the Fourteenth
Amendment but vindicated by it." Today the statute is to be found divided among two
separate but companion code provisions, Rav. STAT. §§ 1977-78 (1875), 42 U.S.C.

§§1981-82 (1952).
The phrasing of the statute in terms of rights of citizenship is suggestive of
a kinship with the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment,
rather than with the much more vigorously applied due process and equal protection
clauses. Of course the emasculation of the privileges and immunities clause long
antedated Buchanan v. Warley.
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tolerably clear, there is, in the hallowed phrase, both "reason and authority" for giving it effect.
So much for Buchanan v. Warley. For perhaps the wrong reasons it rightly decided that the fourteenth amendment barred states
from establishing Negro ghettos. It is familiar history that Buchanan
and subsequent decisions
"caused white supporters of residential
segregation to rely upon the judicial enforcement of racial covenants." 4
A generation elapsed in which, encouraged by dicta in Corrigan v.
Buckley," courts sustained the covenants with regularity. But if
Buchanan was right, the result at last reached in Shelley was foreordained; for it had long been clear that whether a challenged discrimination is legislative or judicial is a matter of no consequence in
finding the state action on which the fourteenth amendment operates.4"
The distribution of state power among the three branches of government "is for the determination of the State. And its determination
one way or the other cannot be an element in the inquiry whether the
due process of law prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment has been
respected by the State or its representatives when dealing with matters
involving life or liberty." 4 7 Thus, it was that Shelley at last correctly
ratified the conclusion arrived at by an unsung federal trial judge in
1892 that the enforcement of a racial covenant was a denial of the
48
equal protection of the laws.
The Limits of the Logic
What has been said thus far comes simply to this: Shelley v.
Kraemer, like Gordon v. Gordon, was a case in which the courts were
called on to get people to do things they might have done-but also
might not have done-voluntarily. The racial covenant in Shelley was
.unenforceable judicially becaue the state lacks power to limit land
tenure and occupancy by race.
It would seem to follow that the enforceability of the testamentary
limitation in Gordon v. Gordon should depend on the substantive ques43

1Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Richmond v. Dean, 281 U.S. 704

(1930).
44

VosE, CAucAsiANs ONLY 52 (1959).
45271 U.S. 323 (1926).
46Democratic theory suggests that the distinction is not unimportant at the
ultimate point of testing substantive constitutionality. The United States in its
Brief Amicus Curiae, pp. 83-85, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), suggests that
presumptions of validity attendant on legislation do not work so powerfully to sustain
judicial law-making.
47 Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902).
48
Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (S.D. Cal. 1892). Properly speaking, the
federal court's inability to enforce the covenant should have been articulated in fifth
amendment terms. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). Especially so in the
era before Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

12

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.108:1

tion whether the state has power to inhibit-perhaps to prohibit altogether-miscegenation of Jews and others. If it has not-and one may
infer from Professor Wechsler's criticism of Naim v. Naim,49 where
the Court clumsily retreated from passing on Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute,' that he reads the Constitution adversely to the power
-then enforcement should have been denied.
But it would be idle to suggest that an, analysis which sustains
Shelley v. Kraemer, or undercuts Gordon v. Gordon, sufficiently answers further questions which Professor Wechsler properly sees latent
in Shelley:
"What is the principle involved? . . .Can the state, indeed, em-

ploy its law to vindicate the privacy of property against a trespasser, regardless of the grounds of his exclusion, or does it embrace the owner's reasons for excluding if it buttresses his power
by the law? Would a declaratory judgment that a fee is determinable if a racially restrictive limitation should be violated represent discrimination by the state upon the racial ground? .
Would a judgment of ejectment?"

2

In short, Professor Wechsler is asking whether every instance of
judicial cognition of private discrimination is state action prohibited
by the fourteenth (or fifth) amendment. The answer is "No." But
the answer calls for amplification and for some indication of the categories of situations to which these constitutional prohibitions should
and should not apply.
As a starting point, it may be useful to revert to the Gordon case,
and to Professor Wechsler's query whether the state is "forbidden to
effectuate a will that draws a racial line." Reflection suggests that the
hypothesized "will that draws a racial line" really embraces two quite
different kinds of situations-and the difference between them may
have vital implications.
In one of these situations the state power is exerted-or, if not
exerted, waits in the wings-to induce compliance by others with the
49350 U.S. 891 (1955), 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals sustained the annulment of the marriage of a white woman and a man of Chinese ancestry, apparently resident in Virginia. 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E2d 749 (1955). On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded
the case for amplification of a record whose "inadequacy . . . as to the relationship
of the parties to the Commonwealth of Virginia at the time of the marriage in North
Carolina and upon their return to Virginia" was thought to interfere with resolution
of the constitutional issues. 350 U.S. 891 (1955). The Virginia court's stated inability to arrange for an ampler record, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), left the
case "devoid of a properly presented federal question" and necessitated dismissal of
the appeal. 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
r1 Wechsler 34. Some day, hopefully, the Court will feel itself able forthrightly
to invalidate such laws. See Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
52 Wechsler 29-30.
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discriminatory behavior patterns favored by the testator. This was
what happened in Gordon, where the state power to terminate the son's
interest in his father's estate was utilized as a means of restraining the
son from marrying a non-Jew.
In the second situation the state's acquiescence in the testator's
prejudices extends only to the point of learning his purpose-not to the
point of using state power to compel conformity by others with the
discriminatory pattern. Thus, let us suppose that in Gordon the testamentary limitation barred any share in the estate to a child who had,
before learning the terms of his father's will, married a non-Jew. Under
these circumstances, the probate court's necessary inquiry would be
confined to identifying which of the children were the intended beneficiaries of the testator's prejudice. A determination that the son had
previously married a Catholic and thereby disqualified himself would
not be coercive of the son's or anyone else's present or future behavior.
Here judicial enforcement of the limitation would no more adopt the
testator's prejudices than would enforcement of a will dividing the
testator's property among three named persons all of whom are Jews
and selected for that reason-an exercise of private prejudice the fourteenth amendment can hardly be thought to interfere with.
What marks the line between these cases? The line sought to be
drawn is that beyond which the state assists a private person in seeing
to it that others behave in a fashion which the state could not itself
have ordained. The principle underlying the distinction is this: the
fourteenth amendment permits each his personal prejudices and guarantees him free speech and press and worship, together with a degree
of free economic enterprise, as instruments with which to persuade
others to adopt his prejudices; but access to state aid to induce others
to conform is barred.
What does this view of the amendment mean in concrete terms?
It means that an employer may freely contract with a union to maintain a lily-white shop, but that the provision is one which fails whenever the employer's self-interest so dictates: the union cannot coerce
compliance through an injunction or an award of damages. Conversely, however, a court need not-at the behest of Negro third-party
Judicial refusal
maleficiaries-compel abandonment of the provision.'
53 Compare Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
An employee of
Cutter Laboratories was discharged on the stated grounds of Communist Party membership and misrepresentation of her pre-employment history. The collective bargaining agreement permitted discharge for "just cause," and a board of arbitration
held, on the union's petition for reinstatement, that the employee had actually been
fired for union activity which was of course held not to be "just cause." On petition
for enforcement of the award the lower California courts affirmed the board's order
of reinstatement, but the state supreme court reversed. 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d
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to interfere is entirely analogous to legislative disinclination to enact a
fair employment practices act-a sovereign decision to leave private
prejudice alone. (Conversely, of course, the fourteenth amendment
would be no barrier if the courts or the legislature were to insist that
private hiring proceed on a non-racial basis.) "
To take a very different example, this view of the amendment means
that the homeowner can continue to turn others off his premises, no
matter how outrageous his standards of exclusion, and may call on the
police to enforce the laws of trespass on his behalf. So too-as lawyers
have supposed ever since the Court in the Civil Rights Cases - held it
beyond Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment to bar the
exclusion of Negroes from private "inns, public conveyances . .
and other places of amusement"-with the proprietor of an ice cream
905 (1955). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 350 U.S. 816 (1956), and then,
after briefs and argument, dismissed the writ 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
The majority of the Court found that the California Supreme Court had held
that "just cause" included Communist Party membership, and that this holding disposed of the case on non-federal grounds. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Black, dissented. The dissenters were less certain of the state
supreme court's rationale, but felt that if that court had refused enforcement on
the ground that "just cause" included Communist Party membership, this was judicial
action of the same character condemned in Shelley v. Kraemer.
The analysis proposed in the text suggests that both the majority and the dissenting opinions were wrong: the dissenters were wrong in characterizing what happened as one in which California's "courts [were] implicated in . . . a discriminatory
scheme." 351 U.S. at 302. Assuming the union and the employer did agree that
Communist Party membership was a bar to employment or an appropriate ground
for discharge, all that the California courts did was to leave the situation alone-4.e.,
not interfere with the employer's exercise of a right it and the union agreed the
employer should possess. On the other hand, if the employer had failed to discharge
an employee for a reason-e.g., Communist Party membership, or being a Negrothat it had promised the union would disqualify an employee from continued service,
the union's resort to the courts to compel discharge in conformity with the agreement would have meant that the "courts [were] implicated in . . . a discriminatory
scheme."
Conversely, the too-broad reasoning of the majority concluding that construction
of the term "just cause" in the bargaining agreement to include Communist Party
membership was a matter of "local law" presenting no federal question must be
regarded as unsound. There was in fact no federal question in the case the Court
decided, because the California courts simply left the employer free to act or fail to
act in the fashion the employer and the union had mutually agreed upon. But a
federal question of major proportion would have been presented if the California
courts had been called on to compel the employer, against its wishes, to discharge
an employee in conformity with the judicial interpretation of a contractual obligation
to fire a class of worker whose delineation was construed as embracing such criteria
as being a Communist or a Negro. (This discussion is not meant to suggest that
the constitutional questions involved in judicially compelling the discharge of a
Communist qua Communist and a Negro qua Negro are interchangeable.)
This consideration of Black v. Cutter Laboratories has not necessitated any
classification of the arbitration proceeding as state or non-state action. Such a
classification should depend on whether adherence to an arbitral award is the voluntary election of the parties or depends (as in Black v. Cutter Laboratories) on the
availability of a court order enforcing the award.
54 See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945), and cf. Williams v.
International Bhd., 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P.2d 903 (1946).
55 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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parlor. 6 So, too, with the board of directors of a private cemetery. 7
When the employees and the union, or the private homeowner and the
petty merchant, are aggregated many times into a comprehensive social
entity such as a company town, Marsh v. Alabama " of course suggests that exclusion or refusal to hire by reason of color or faith or
political persuasion is inadmissible. But this is precisely because the
fourteenth amendment is directed at community arrangements, and its
mandates cannot be circumvented by local concepts of property which
purport to make a private barony of a social organism having "all the
characteristics of any other American town." " To be sure, it is relatively easy to put the one-family dwelling, the cemetery and the ice
cream parlor on one side of a line and the company town on the other
side; charting closer cases will be harder, but the process will be one of
those measurements of subtle but decisive differences in degree which
are the familiar province of constitutional adjudication.
Thus, it is suggested, the individual may select his guests at will.
And he may-again, in the absence of limitations imposed by local law
-hire only elderly Negro women to wait upon his table and refuse to
sell or lease his home to any but militant vegetarians. But if he gives
his home to Harvard to be a residence for Negro graduate students,
that limitation is one that the members of the Harvard Corporation
should be free to observe or refrain from observing as they choose,
without judicial or other state intervention-assuming the limitation is
6 See State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958).

Simply licensing

someone to do business does not make him a state agent; indeed extending tax
exemptions or powers of eminent domain or both may not be sufficient. See Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339
But compare the limitations assumed by one who operates a
U.S. 981 (1950).
governmentally conferred monopoly. See Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'rs, 342 U.S.
848 (1951) ; cf. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952).

67
5 In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), the
Court affirmed by an equally divided vote the lower courts' dismissal of a damage
suit brought by a widow against a private cemetery which had refused to bury her
Indian husband in a lot she had purchased, the refusal being predicated on a limitation
of interment to non-Caucasians contained in the deed of sale of the burial lot. When
apprised, on petition for rehearing, of an Iowa statute (provoked by the notoriety
of the case) designed to prevent racial discrimination in interment in the future,
the Court vacated its original affirmance and dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted; three justices dissented from dismissal of the writ. 349 U.S.
70 (1955).
9
In terms of the analysis proposed here, the private cemetery was entitled to
refrain from according interment for any arbitrary reason, and the fourteenth amendment did not impose on the Iowa courts an obligation to compel the cemetery to
abandon its perversity at the instance of Mrs. Rice. Under Iowa law she had an
enforceable contract right to have the cemetery inter qualified Caucasians-but not
her husband-in the lot she purchased. The fourteenth amendment gives her no
greater right.
G8 326 U.S. 501 (1946), reversing the trespass conviction of a Jehovah's Witness
who distributed religious tracts on the streets of a company town; see Tucker v.
Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946). Compare Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y.
512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
69 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
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one which is itself a preference proscribed by the fourteenth amendment.
And, it would seem to follow, a reversionary clause to take effect on
failure of the limitation could not be enforced by a declaratory judgment, by ejectment, or otherwise.6
Of course it must be acknowledged that no pure logical line can
be drawn between, on the one hand, permitting the members of the
Harvard Corporation to observe the limitation in their discretion and,
on the other, denying access to the courts to enforce the limitation. As
Elias Clark has made abundantly clear in his extremely perceptive study
of the implications of the Girard College Case,"' the law touches the
modern charitable trust at so many points that its "administration
.

.

must ultimately be characterized as state action."

02

But it is

also true, as Professor Clark observes, that, "in the last analysis, all
human activity is controlled by law." ' In short, we are again faced
with the ineluctable duty of making distinctions of degree. And distinctions between more formal and less formal manifestations of state
authority are defensible until the essentially experiential process of
constitutional litigation demonstrates their inadequacy. Certainly one
would be ill-advised to launch a permanent and categorical demarcation
exempting the discretion of the administrators of charitable trusts from
constitutional scrutiny. "Were the Ford Foundation to disperse its
millions on a discriminatory basis, society would find the result intolerable." 64 So too, perhaps, with the powers exercised by vast industrial and financial entities pursuant to state charters of incorporation."' Yet there is much wisdom in Professor Wechsler's preference
that "the issues [be] faced through legislation, where there is room for
drawing lines that courts are not equipped to draw." " In practical
terms this is presumably the answer, for the hypothesized discriminations of the Ford Foundation or the steel industry would be met by
corrective legislation long before a proper case had lumbered its way
past the paper curtain of certiorari into its final resting place in the
U. S. Reports.
60 See Capital Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252
(1957); but cf. Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311,
88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
61 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957), discussed at text
accompanying note 68 infra.
02Clark, Charitable Trusts, the FourteenthAmendment, and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979, 1008 (1957).
63Id. at 1009.

104Ibid.
65 Compare Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity--Protection
of Personal Rights from Invasion through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. R-v.

933 (1952).
6 Wechsler 31.
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But one who essays to tinker with constitutional theory may not
properly take refuge in the likelihood of less-than-constitutional solutions to bail him out of following the limits of his logic. He must face
the fact that the distinction between judgments of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court and decisions of the members of the Harvard
Corporation cannot permanently be sanctified in terms of state versus
private action. What is offered is tentative, a beginning point, premised
on the avowed value judgment that in 1959 it is consistent with the
democratic theory embodied in the fourteenth amendment to let the
members of the Harvard Corporation choose if they will to prefer
Negroes-or whites, or Christian Scientists-in order to assure a
further flow of endowment, or for any other reason. Conversely, it is
submitted, for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to compel
adherence to a discriminatory standard is not consistent with that
democratic theory.
Very likely the conventional conceptualisms of state versus private
power underlying the supposed distinction between judicial enforcement
and trustee discretion will trouble many lawyers habituated to the more
searching inquiries of legal realism. And properly so. Yet the distinction is one which at least in retrospect seems to account for the result
in the case which implicitly "posed a threat to every charitable trust" 67
-the Girard College Case. There the City of Philadelphia, acting
through an official board as trustee pursuant to the will of Stephen
Girard, had since long before the fourteenth amendment utilized the fortune left by Girard to operate a school for "poor, male white orphan
children." In 1957, at the behest of two Negro boys who had vainly
sought admission, the Supreme Court held (without hearing argument)
that "even though the Board was acting as a trustee, its refusal to admit
Foust and Felder to the college because they were Negroes was discrimination by the State. Such discrimination is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment." 's On remand the Pennsylvania courts replaced
the City of Philadelphia with private trustees so that Girard's dominant
discriminatory purpose might continue to be fulfilled; " and the Supreme Court declined to review the new arrangement.7" A private
6
IN

Clark, supra note 62, at 1002.
Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957).

09

it re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844 (1958).
Passing the possibility that the denial of certiorari betokens no approval of the Pennsylvania judgment authorizing the substitution of
private trustees capable of discriminating, the Girard College Case also raises special
questions about the validity of state action (substitution of trustees) precisely calculated to perpetuate a theretofore unlawful racial ban. But these questions are
tangential to the present discussion. Moreover it is perhaps inappropriate for the
writer, who was of counsel, to relitigate the Girard College Case in this forum.
70 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
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undertaking had been remitted to private hands, and the structure of
charitable discrimination appeared secure. Yet if the thesis advanced in
the preceding discussion has validity, the perpetuation of Stephen
Girard's discriminatory plan may not be permanent. For a change of
heart among the private trustees could lead to an abandonment of the
exclusionary scheme with which the Pennsylvania courts should be held
powerless to interfere.
The concern generated by the Girard College Case in some legal
circles mainly stemmed from the feeling that a fundamental right to
make arbitrary testamentary dispositions was in jeopardy. It is surely
appropriate to recognize the high premium Anglo-American traditions
put upon testamentary freedom. But other values also come into play.
Every community imposes limits of some sort on how far the decedent
may project his idiosyncracies into the future. And the appropriateness
of setting these limits is not open to question because, in the quaint
phrase, "the right to take property by devise or descent is the creature
of the law, and not a natural right. . . ." 1 But it is precisely those
enterprises that are "creature[s] of the law" to which the fourteenth
amendment is addressed.
Reappraisal in fourteenth amendment terms of those nominally
private arrangements which are "creature[s] of the law" is only beginning. Without torturing the prevailing syllogism, which is our
heritage from the Civil Rights Cases, that the fourteenth amendment
speaks only to state action, the frontiers of state action could be pushed
forward to embrace much-e.g., trustee discretion-not presently in-

cluded. Alternatively there is ground for arguing that preservation of
fourteenth amendment rights may necessarily and properly require national restraints-perhaps only by Congress, perhaps by the courts as
well-upon private action which tends to undermine the oportunity to
enjoy those rights. The principles which support national regulation of
intrastate commerce where necessary to the protection of interstate commerce 72 may have some transferability.'
But for many-and perhaps
most-present purposes there has been no compelling demonstration of
the need to push the fourteenth amendment to the ultimate limits of its
logic. We are at a way station. Case by case-as in other realms of
constitutional adjudication--experience will push us forward.
"l'
Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898).

v.Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 55 (1900).

See Knowlton

72
See Houston E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914);
Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). Cf. the concurring opinion
of Justice Pitney in Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 275, 285-90 (1921).
7
" 3See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-7 (1946); but cf. the concurring
opinion of justice Frankfurter, id. at 510.
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WHITE PRIMARIES

A closely related area of adjudication in which experience has already pushed us forward is the group of cases testing the validity of
the white primary. From the turn of the century to World War II
the white primary was the principal device by which the white South
barred Negroes from participating in the political process. When the
exclusion of Negroes from the primary was a formal state requirement,
its invalidity was pretty clear. It was widely assumed that relinquishment of formal state controls of the primary would effectively and constitutionally permit the dominant Democratic Party to perpetuate the
exclusion as a private venture. For a time this worked. But in 1944,
in Smith v. Allwright,7 4 the Court changed its mind, imposing on the
Texas Democratic Party standards of equal treatment derived from
the fifteenth amendment which, like the fourteenth, is directed in terms
only at state action.
The result in Smith v. Alkwright seems inconsistent with the result
ultimately reached in the Girard College Case, where state disengagement apparently sufficed to authenticate continued racial exclusion. Is
there an explanation for the apparent inconsistency? Are there, despite
Professor Wechsler's doubts, "neutral .principles that satisfy the
mind" "; which support Smith v. Allwright? To answer these queries
a closer scrutiny of the primary cases seems in order.
The first of the white primary cases was Nixon v. Herndon, 6 in
which Holmes for a unanimous Court held that a Texas statute barring
Negroes from voting in the Democratic primary violated the fourteenth
amendment. The next Texas statute vested in the State Executive
Committee of the Democratic Party power to set criteria for admission
to the primary-and Nixon returned to court when the committee
exercised its power so as to bar Negroes. Again Nixon prevailed,
Cardozo in Nixon v. Condon"m holding for a divided Court that the
committee was acting on behalf of the state. Invalidation of the second
statute left authority to determine admission to the Democratic primary
in the hands of the Democratic state convention, where, Cardozo had
indicated, it inherently belonged. The convention's refusal to let
Negroes vote.in the primary precipitated Grovey v. Townsend, 8 which
unanimously sustained the exclusion as a private discrimination untouched by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.
74321 U.S. 649 (1944).
75 Weclsler 29.
16273 U.S. 536 (1927).
77286 U.S. 73 (1932).
78295 U.S. 45 (1935).
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The Classic case 7 9 -ratifying federal authority to protect the integrity of Louisiana primaries for candidates for federal office-served
to instruct the Supreme Court that in most Southern states the Democratic primary is effectively the election. With this in mind the Supreme Court in Smith v. Allwright decided to reconsider the issue
posed in Grovey v. Townsend. Specifically what concerned the Court
was whether the presence in Nixon v. Condon and the absence in Grovey
v. Townsend of a statute vesting discretion in an organ of the Democratic Party to determine admissibility to the primary was really a
matter of constitutional dimension-whether, in short, the Court could
sanction "a variation in the result from so slight a change in form." '
The answer was in the negative. "The United States is a constitutional
democracy. Its organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate
in the choice of elected officials without restriction by any State because of race. This grant . . . is not to be nullified by a State
through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private
organization to practice racial discrimination in the election." 81 And
in Terry v. Adams,' in 1953, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Smith
v. Allwright in even more extreme circumstances. For there Negroes
were barred not from the county primary as such but from a pre-primary
plebiscite conducted by the Jaybird Democratic Association. Justice
Black wrote:
"The only election that has counted in this Texas county for more
than fifty years has been that held by the Jaybirds from which
Negroes were excluded. The Democratic primary and the general
election have become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the
choice that has already been made in Jaybird elections from which
Negroes have been excluded. It is immaterial that the state does
not control that part of this elective process which it leaves for the
Jaybirds to manage. . . . The effect of the whole procedure,
Jaybird primary plus Democratic primary plus general election, is
to do precisely that which the . . . Amendment forbids-strip
Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting the officials who
control the local county matters that intimately touch the daily
lives of citizens." 83
From a doctrinal point of view the issue these cases present is that
of finding the state action on which the Constitution imposes limitations
when all the state has done, as in the Girard College Case, is to withdraw from the arena-"casting its electoral process in a form which
79 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).

80 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661 (1944).
81
Id. at 664.
82 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
3 Id.

at 469-70.
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permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination. . . ." s
Is failure to restrain private prejudice equatable with active state discrimination? A bald affirmative answer sounds destructive of principles
regarded as settled ever since the Civil Rights Cases. But even there,
it is well to remember, the Court's conclusion that Congress could not
penalize "the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the public
conveyance or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation," '
involved a pertinent judicial assumption. The assumption was that
such refusal constituted "an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable
by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to redress by those
laws until the contrary appears." 8" Is there an intimation that if the
contrary were made to appear, if it were demonstrable that a state
afforded a Negro no remedy for such a discrimination, one might then
establish a basis for invoking a federal remedy fashioned by Congress or
the courts? Perhaps. At all events, long after the Civil Rights Cases,
Chief Justice Taft-in the very different context of labor relationsarticulated for the Court a federal right of protection from state withdrawal of a pre-existing civil remedy:
"It is true that no one has a vested right in any particular rule of
the common law, but it is also true that the legislative power of a
State can only be exerted in subordination .to the fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty of due process in the
Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve, and that a purely
arbitrary or capricious exercise of that power whereby a wrongful
and highly injurious invasion of property rights, as here, is practically sanctioned and the owner stripped of all real remedy, is
wholly at variance with those principles." 8
Finally, note should be taken of the Court's recent opinion in
Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson.' This was an action brought
by nonunion employees of the Union Pacific Railroad to enjoin enforcement as against them of the union shop provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement entered into between a railway brotherhood and
the carrier: being required to pay union dues as the price of holding
their jobs was said by plaintiffs to breach various constitutional liberties. But wherein lay -the governmental action subject to constitutional
limitation? Nebraska, in whose courts the action was brought, had
a "right to work law" which made union shop provisions unenforceable.
8

4 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).

8109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883).
86 Ibid.
s7 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329-30 (1921).
88351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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From 1934 to 1951 the Federal Railway Labor Act had contained a
similar provision governing collective bargaining agreements in the
railroad industry. But in 1951 Congress reversed its policy and
amended the Railway Labor Act so as to permit the negotiation of such
agreements, the laws of "any state" to the contrary notwithstanding.
Plaintiffs argued that this pre-emptive act subjected the resultant union
shop provision, which the contracting parties were then free to adopt or
not as they chose, to fifth amendment limitations. Numerous amici
attorneys general-including Attorney General Almond of Virginia
and Attorney General Shepperd of Texas-filed briefs endorsing this
view. 9 And the Court agreed, citing Smith v. Allwright: "If private
rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made pursuant
to federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded.
• In other words, the federal statute is the source of the power and
authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed." "
What has been said above puts the emphasis in the white primary
cases on the shift from state regulation to formal state neutrality, with
the suggestion that doctrinally the state is still responsible for abandoning a situation "in a form which permits a private organization to
practice racial discrimination." "' This, it is submitted, is an inadequate
basis for supporting the results reached in Smith v. Allwright and
Terry v. Adams, for it suggests that a different result would and should
have been reached if the state had never played a formal role and
Nixon v. Herndon and Nixon v. Condon had not been litigated. Fortunately, Smith v. Aliwright and Terry v. Adams need not and they
in fact do not depend on imputing to the state continued responsibility
for an activity which the state once regulated. If this were their
rationale, the fourteenth amendment would have been dispositive of
these cases, as it was of Nixon v. Herndon and Nixon v. Condon.
Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams actually stand on narrower
and firmer ground-the fifteenth amendment, which expressly protects
"the right to vote" against abridgement "on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."
Yet how can the fifteenth amendment apply where the fourteenth
does not, since both are addressed to state action? The question
generates its own answer: with respect to the particular problem to
89 Attorney General Cook of Georgia filed a statement supporting the brief filed
by Attorney General Shepperd. It is notable that the AFL-CIO, in an ainicwr brief
supporting the union shop agreements, likewise urged that they be tested against constitutional limitations.
90351 U.S. at 232. The Court went on to hold the union shop constitutional.
See also Allen v. Southern Ry., 43 L.R.R.M. 2652 (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1959); Looper v.
Georgia S. & F. Ry., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101 (1957).
91 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).
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which the fifteenth amendment is addressed-protecting the right of
Negroes not to be discriminated against at the polls-the amendment
must impose on the states a heavier affirmative duty to assure an equal
franchise than does the fourteenth. If this were not so, the fifteenth
amendment would be a redundancy, having no scope for separate and
effective application.
Construing the fifteenth amendment to be an independently meaningful guarantee is in harmony with its framers' comprehensive purposes.

"It was .

.

. well understood in Congress at the time the

Amendment was under consideration that it applied to any election,
from that of presidential elector down to the most petty election for a
justice of the peace or a fence-viewer." "2 But the Court had learned in
Classic that in the deep South the only opportunity to exercise the constitutionally protected right to vote arises at the primary (or, as in
Terry v. Adams, the pre-primary) balloting. Thus, to find no state
duty to prevent the exclusion of Negroes from the only elections which
matter would be to delete the fifteenth amendment from the Constitution.
Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams do not mean, as Professor Wechsler suggests they mean,9 3 that the Constitution would
prevent a dominant political party from excluding from its primary
the members of a disfavored faith. For the fifteenth amendment speaks
only to racial distinctions, not to religious distinctions or any of the
other arbitrary classifications interdicted by the equal protection clause.
In short what Professor Wechsler sees as a cognate form of
exclusion could be reached only through the fourteenth amendment.
Imposing fourteenth amendment restraints on a southern Democratic
primary would have to be predicated on a judgment that managing
the electoral process is an inalienable sovereign function, and that whoever does that managing acts on the state's behalf. Perhaps such a
judgment is supportable. "Only a State can own a Statehouse; only
a State can get income by taxing." o1 So too, it may be plausibly urged,
only a state can conduct elections-especially so where the state is one
in which, under the Constitution, a republican form of government is
perpetually guaranteed. 5 But the argument, whatever its validity, is
one which goes far beyond the limited guarantee of racial equality in
the political process embodied in the fifteenth amendment and properly
vindicated in Smith v. Allwright and Terry v. Adams.
0 MATHEWs, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 38 (1909).

Weclhsler 29.
Frankfurter, J., in New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
95 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
W
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THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION CASES
Of the cases which trouble Professor Wechsler, the one which
causes him the greatest concern is the initial decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,96 decreeing the invalidity of state-imposed segregation in public schools. If Professor Wechsler's criticisms were simply
addressed to the form of the Court's opinion in Brown, one would be
hard put to dispute them. Certainly the opinion is most obscure in its
crucial elements-e.g., is inequality a "fact"? Whatever it is, how
do judges determine it? Moreover, the opinion does not appear to
articulate any grounds for disposing of the arguably quite different
issues-segregated beaches, 7 golf courses,9" buses, 9 and parks 1__
subsequently resolved per curiam in apparent reliance on Brown.

But Professor Wechsler goes further. He suggests that the problem in Brown is not one of discrimination at all, for both races are
disadvantaged and the burden of guilt surely falls more heavily on
whites than on Negroes. The real legal issue, Professor Wechsler
believes, is a claim of right of association balanced against an equal
and opposite claim of right of nonassociation. Seeing the issue this
way, he seems to suggest that no supportable opinion could have been
written in Brown-or at least that writing such an opinion is a "challenge" not yet successfully met.""- Faced with this challenge, perhaps
one who supports the judgment but confesses dissatisfaction with the
opinion rendered has some obligation to draft what he regards as an
adequate opinion:
"These four consolidated cases, which come to us from
three federal district courts and one state supreme court,
present a single question: the compatibility with the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause of state laws
which require, or permit local authorities to require, segregation of white and Negro school children in compulsory
public schools. The courts below all sustained the challengecT laws; but there was division among them on the
subsidiary issue whether it is harmful to Negro children, in
whose behalf these class actions were brought, to shunt
them off on racial grounds to schools which are the equivalent in every non-racial dimension of the white schools
96347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97
98

Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).

Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
99Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
100 New Orleans Parks Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
101 Wechsler 34.
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from which they are barred. (In the Delaware case, the
state supreme court found that, quite apart from racial
separation, the Negro school was not the equivalent of the
white schools.)
"At the outset we are strongly urged to affirm without
further ado on the ground that educational policy is beyond the purview of federal power. As a general proposition this is of course true. The management of American
schools is one of the most cherished and vital local prerogatives, and the enormous success of American public education doubtless owes much to the diversity born of our
federal structure. But public education, like all other
publicly regulated enterprises, must conform to the comprehensive standards which the Fourteenth Amendment
imposes on all state activity. West Virginia v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624; cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510.
"It is also urged upon us that the extensive research
into the history of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption,
so diligently conducted by counsel at our request, fails to
disclose any intent on the part of the framers to end
segregation in public schools. We think it is true, but not
of itself dispositive. For one thing, it is familiar constitutional history that this Court has progressively brought
within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment many
issues and many litigants probably not contemplated by
those who framed and ratified the Amendment. Moreover-and of more immediate moment-we read the history
of the Amendment as contemplating an essentially dynamic
development by Congress and this Court of the liberties
outlined in such generalized terms in the Amendment.
"Next it is argued that the precise question at issue
has already been disposed of by this Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. In response it is said that Plessy
dealt with segregation on intrastate railways, and is distinguishable. We think it is not possible to ignore this
Court's heavy reliance, in sustaining the segregation challenged in Plessy, on what it regarded as the manifest
validity of segregated public schools. But we do not doubt
our power, or indeed our obligation, to re-examine grave
constitutional questions in a proper case. Given the finality
of constitutional determinations, they must always be 'open
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to reconsideration, in the light of new experience and
greater knowledge and wisdom.' 317 U.S. XLII, XLVII
(Remarks of Chief Justice Stone on the death of Justice
Brandeis). And this is especially true when the constitutional provisions at issue are themselves of an evolutionary
generality.
"Plessy v. Ferguson essentially rests on three interconnected propositions. The first is that the equal protection clause was intended to secure equality of 'civil and
political rights' but was not intended to affect social relationships. The second is that 'Jim Crow laws'-laws requiring segregation of whites and Negroes-operate only in
the social arena. The third is that such laws-providing
as they commonly do 'separate but equal' facilities-neither
impose nor imply inequality except as such inequality lies
in the eye of the beholder.
"We think that on re-examination these propositions
cannot be sustained. Nothing in the equal protection
clause suggests a dichotomy between laws affecting civil
and political rights and those affecting social relationships.
That clause proscribes all laws which impose special disabilities on particular persons or groups without any
reasoned basis for the differential treatment. Therefore
we must decide (1) whether there is a demonstrable state
need for the racial divisions imposed by the Jim Crow laws
here involved, and (2) whether these racial divisions work
significant harm to the segregated Negro.
"On the issue of the reasonableness of governmentally
imposed distinctions between whites and Negroes, as well
as on the issue of whether harm accrues to either group
through enforced separation, we have been deluged with
scholarly writings. These writings supplement extensive
testimony which is of record in some, but not all, of the
cases before us. Learned and impressive authority is deeply
engaged on both sides of these twin issues. Were it our
function to assess what has been put before us, we would
find ourselves unpersuaded that there are demonstrable
differences other than those of pigment between whites
and Negroes, or that any state policy other than the impermissible one of nourishing race prejudice (see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81) underlies the re-
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quirement that the races be separated. Moreover, we
would be inclined to surmise that governmental separation
of the races sets in motion grievous consequences for whites
and Negroes alike.
"But, assuming we were competent to make such judgments, we do not think we are called on to do so in order
to determine the issues presently tendered. For we start
from the base point that in the United States 'all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect.' Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216. Certainly legislation cast in such
terms is not entitled to the ordinary presumptions of
validity. On the contrary there is special need for 'a
searching judicial inquiry into the legislative judgment in
situations where prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may tend to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect
minorities.' Justice Stone dissenting in Minersville School
Districtv. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606. See United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4. We could not,
therefore, sustain the reasonableness of these racial distinctions and the absence of harm said to flow from them,
unless we were prepared to say that no factual case can be
made the other way. As indicated above, we are not prepared to say this.
"We have said that we do not think it incumbent
upon us, at least for present purposes, to resolve controversies as to the justification for and impact of Jim Crow
legislation. But we would be less than candid if we failed
to acknowledge that denial of the degrading effects of such
legislation seems to us to border on the disingenuous:
'[T]he Jim Crow laws applied to all Negroes-not merely to the rowdy, or drunken, or
surly, or ignorant ones. The new laws did not
countenance the old conservative tendency to
distinguish between classes of the race, to encourage the "better" element, and to draw it into
a white alliance. Those laws backed up the
Alabamian who told the disfranchising convention of his state that no Negro in the world was
the equal of "the least, poorest, lowest-down white
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man I ever knew." . . . The Jim Crow laws put
the authority of the state or city in the voice of
the street-car conductor, the railway brakeman,
the bus driver, the theater usher, and also into
the voice of the hoodlum of the public parks and
playgrounds. They gave free rein and the majesty
of the law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have been curbed, blunted, or deflected.
'The Jim Crow laws, unlike feudal laws, did
not assign the subordinate group a fixed status
in society. They were constantly pushing the
Negro farther down.' C. VANN WOODWARD, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW, p. 93.
'All others can see and understand this. How can we
properly shut our minds to it?' Bailey v. Drexel Furniture
Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37. We see little room for doubt that
it is the function of Jim Crow laws to make identification
as a Negro a matter of stigma.
Such governmental
denigration is a form of injury the Constitution recognizes
and will protect against. See joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123.
"We have ventured to disclose our intuitions about
issues hotly controverted by those social scientists professionally entitled to have opinions. We would think it
corrosive of the judicial function were we to translate our
amateur wisdom into constitutional imperatives.
Fortunately, disposition of these cases does not require us to
pursue such a ruinous course. Suffice it here to conclude
that the constitutional doubts instantly generated by statutes drawing racial lines have not been allayed. We have
never demanded proof that a Negro tried, or merely indicted, by a jury from which Negroes are systematically
excluded was subjected to actual discrimination because
of his race. Yet we have reversed criminal convictions
prefaced by such racial exclusion ever since Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303. As there made plain, it was
'the apprehended existence of prejudice' by whites against
Negroes that led to adoption of the equal protection
clause. We are not persuaded that the prejudice apprehended by the framers does not infect the bluntly racial
laws before us. Therefore they cannot be sustained.
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"The 'separate but equal' doctrine announced in
Plessy v. Fergusonwas the product of sophistication. At an
earlier day it was apparent to this Court that mere separation by reason of race was discriminatory. In 1873, in
Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445, this Court recognized
that a federal statute of 1866 prohibiting a railroad from
excluding persons 'on account of color,' was not met by
the use of separate cars for Negroes. This Court read the
statute as a direction 'that this discrimination must cease,
and the colored and white races, in the use of the cars, be
placed on an equality.' It was in such a natural sense that
this Court first understood the generous ambit of the equal
protection clause. 'What is this but declaring that the law
in the States shall be the same for the black as for the
white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall
stand equal before the laws of the states and, in regard to
the colored race, for whose protection the Amendment
was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be
made against them by law because of their color?'
Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, at 307. It is to this
original understanding that we return.
"In support of what we deem to be the well-founded
contention that governmentally imposed segregation carries with it a stigma directed at the segregated group,
plaintiffs have placed great emphasis on the aggravated
onus of segregation imposed in facilities-such as public
schools here at issue-which the segregated group is required to utilize. We do not find it necessary to make a
present determination whether segregation by law could
be sustained in state facilities made available for the voluntary use of its citizens-public parks, for example. That
case is not now before us. It may, however, be appropriate to observe that where facilities are voluntary the
community's asserted need to ordain segregation seems
even less weighty than in the cases before us: for under
such circumstances those for whom racial mingling is obnoxious are under no obligation to attend. What deserves
present mention, however, is that defendants likewise take
comfort from the compulsory character of school attendance laws. This factor is said to constitute a special
ground for sustaining state imposed segregation. We are
told that invalidation of required segregation in public
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schools arbitrarily elevates plaintiffs' claim of right not to
be separated on racial lines above an equally weighty claim
of right of others, both white and Negro, not to be compelled to mingle. But we think the contention fails. To
the extent that implementation of this decision forces
racial mingling on school children against their will, or
against the will of their parents, this consequence follows
because the community through its political processes has
chosen and may continue to choose compulsory educationjust as, from time to time, the nation has, through federal
legislation, adopted the principle of coerced association
implicit in a draft army. In neither instance can the
coercion be said to emanate from this Court or from the
Constitution. In any event, parents sufficiently disturbed
at the prospect of having their children educated in democratic fashion in company with their peers are presumably
entitled to fulfill their educational responsibilities in other
ways. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510.
"Finally, we are warned that a departure from Plessy
v. Ferguson will be accompanied by vast social unrest-that
the principle of mandatory racial separation is so ingrained
in southern life that relaxation of it will promote widespread discord between and within the races. Nevertheless, 'important as is the preservation of the public peace,
this aim cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances
which deny rights created or protected by the federal Constitution.' Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60.
"Accordingly the judgments below, except for that in
the Delaware case, must be reversed. But the form and
timing of the mandates appropriate in these cases present
problems of such magnitude that we will for the present
withhold the entry of judgments and continue the cases
on our docket to permit further argument relating to these
procedural questions .
A draft opinion, prepared in hindsight by one who has no responsibility to decide, is only an academic exercise designed to prove a point.
The fateful national consequences of Brown v. Board of Education flow
from the opinion and judgment actually rendered. Professor Wechsler,
sympathetic to the result but skeptical of the rationale, is frankly uncertain of history's verdict: "Who will be bold enough to say whether
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the judgment in the segregation cases will be judged fifty years from
now to have advanced the cause of brotherhood or to have illustrated
Bagehot's dictum that the 'courage which strengthens an enemy, arid
which so loses, not only the present battle, but many after battles, is
a heavy curse to men and nations'." 102 But some are bold enoughor fool-hardy enough-to make the prophecy Professor Wechsler
eschews: the judgment in the segregation cases will as the decades
pass give ever deeper meaning to our national life. It will endure as
long as our Constitution and our democratic faith endure.
NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

If the judgments in the covenant cases, the white primary cases,
and the school cases are not supportable on the basis of neutral constitutional principles, they deserve to be jettisoned. Indeed, if the
integrity of our judicial institutions means anything it means that
irresponsible decisions will at last generally find their way to the
oblivion of Dred Scott,' Hammer v. Dagenhart, 104 United States v.
Butler""5 and comparable cases. Surely to conclude that bad decisions
are as negotiable as good in democratic currency would be to rob of
all significance the judicial authority and the judicial self-restraint so
painfully and prayerfully developed.
The thesis articulated above is that neutral constitutional principles do sustain the three great groups of cases. But in any final
assessment of these cases it cannot be too much stressed that the decisive
constitutional principles here relevant are in a vital sense not neutral.
The three post-Civil War Amendments were fashioned to one major
end-an end to which we are only now making substantial stridesthe full emancipation of the Negro:
"We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events,
almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to
us all; and on the most casual examination of the language of these
amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each,
and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and
firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newlymade freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him. It is true that
only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by
'o 2 Wechsler, Reflections on the Conference, Col. L. Alumni Bull. Dec. 1958,
p. 1,2.
103 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 691 (1857).
104247 U.S. 251 (1918).

105297 U.S. 1 (1936).
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speaking of his color and his slavery. But it is just as true that
each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that
race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth.
"We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this
protection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to
have their fair and just weight in any question of construction.
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the
Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any
other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or
the Chinese coolie labor .system shall develop slavery of the
Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may
safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are
assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within
the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though
the party interested may not be of African descent. But what
we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any fair
and just construction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said
was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were
designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the
Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished,
as far as constitutional law can accomplish it." 106
NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

The central purpose of this paper has been to reappraise the several
landmark cases in the field of race discrimination which Professor
Wechsler has called into question. Intentionally, therefore, its principal focus has been upon those cases, not upon Professor Wechsler's
insistence on the disposition of constitutional cases pursuant to neutral
principles. It was hoped, indeed, that acquiescence in Professor
Wechsler's thesis of neutrality would not only serve as an acceptable
point of departure for study of the discrimination cases, but would also
obviate controversy about jurisprudential issues which bear only tangentially on the cases themselves.
To accomplish this pacific purpose, the assumption was indulged
that what Professor Wechsler chiefly seeks is a method of adjudication which is disinterested, reasoned, and comprehensive of the full
range of like constitutional issues, coupled with a method of judicial
exposition which plainly and fully articulates the real bases of decision.
So stated, the proferred creed is hard to resist, and few are likely to
be counted in opposition. To be sure, there may be no "positive law
which binds the judges . . . to give a reasoned opinion from the
bench, in support of their judgment upon matters that are stated before
106 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
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them. But the course hath prevailed from the oldest times. It hath
been so general and so uniform, that it must be considered as the law
of the land." 10
But perhaps this free-hand effort to intuit Professor Wechsler's
meaning has been unfair. Perhaps, instead of fulfilling the purpose of
seating everyone at the same jurisprudential table, all that has been done
is to take Professor Wechsler's vintage wine and water it down to grape
juice. If this is so, it was an act of hospitable ignorance, not of malice.
Unfortunately, it is not so easy to. reverse the alchemy and reconstruct Professor Wechsler's true meaning. Very likely the idea of
neutral constitutional adjudication does have implications broader than
those notions of dispassionate judging which have here been ascribed
to it. But if so, Professor Wechsler is best situated to illuminate the
motto emblazoned on his flag. Short of that, it remains for this writer
to state that the judicial neutrality he himself espouses does not preclude
the disciplined exercise by a Supreme Court Justice of that Justice's
individual and strongly held philosophy. Surely our Constitution is
stronger because Cardozo-probing the "liberty" guaranteed by the
fifth and fourteenth amendments-persuaded the Court that "freedom
of thought, and speech .

.

. is the matrix, the indispensable condi-

tion, of nearly every other form of freedom." "' It would have been
stronger still had the Court believed, with Brandeis, that "the right
to be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."

109

If one is right in guessing that Professor Wechsler would not
demur to the method by which Cardozo and Brandeis found constitutional equivalents for these deeply felt convictions, one is forced to
speculate on what it is that makes their method palatable. Very likely
Justice Frankfurter, who has thought long and deeply about constitutional adjudication, has put the matter best:
"In dealing not with the machinery of government but with
human rights, the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity
of meaning, is not an unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions. Words being symbols do not speak without a gloss. On the one hand the gloss may be the deposit of his107 The language is Burke's in the Report of the Committee of Managers on the
Causes of the Duration of Mr. Hasting's Trial in 4 SPEEcHEs oF EDMUND BURKE
200-01 (1816) ; it is quoted by Justice Frankfurter in a footnote to his opinion for the
Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 n.4 (1952). Actually there is a
certain amount of "positive law" imposing on judges some obligation to explain their
judgments. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ; compare OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2503.20
(Page 1954), the predecessor of which caused the Supreme Court some confusion in
Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1952).
108 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
109 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
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tory, whereby a term gains technical content. . .
On the other
hand, the gloss of some of the verbal symbols of the Constitution
does not give them a fixed technical content. It exacts a continuing process of application. When the gloss has thus not been
fixed but is a function of the process of judgment, the judgment
is bound to fall differently at different times and differently at
the same time through different judges. . . . We may not draw
on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the
limits that bind judges in their judicial function. . . . To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity
no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and selfcriticism, incertitude that one's own views are incontestable and
alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are precisely
the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the
qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with
ultimate judicial power." 11
If Professor Wechsler means what Justice Frankfurter meant, the
issue need not be pursued. But if Professor Wechsler's neutrality
inhabits a more spacious domain, present efforts to capture and tame
the concept are plainly unavailing. Suffice it to say, as Myres McDougal has recently said in another context,
"The essence of a reasoned decision by the authority of the
secular values of a public order of human dignity is a disciplined
appraisal of alternative choices of immediate consequences in terms
of preferred long-term effects, and not in either the timid foreswearing of concern for immediate consequences or in the quixotic
search for criteria of decision that transcend the world of men and
values in metaphysical fantasy. The reference of legal principles
must be either to their internal-logical-arrangement or to the
external consequences of their application. It remains mysterious
what criteria for decision a 'neutral' system could offer." "'
110 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-72 (1952). See Freund, Mr. .Jtstice
Frankfurter,26 U. CHI. L. Rv.205, 210, 214-15 (1959).
111 McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, 1959
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